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THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD: VOICING THE 
DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR 
UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN 
Linda Kelly Hill* 
Abstract: Every year, the Department of Homeland Security detains thou-
sands of unaccompanied alien children who have crossed the border into 
the United States. The framework set out in Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services and Gideon v. Wainwright for all civil litigants creates a stumbling 
block in recognizing a constitutional right to counsel in the immigration 
context, but this Article argues that unaccompanied alien children do, in 
fact, have a constitutional right to counsel. Unaccompanied alien children 
are in unique circumstances and their right to counsel is three-fold. First, 
immigration law and procedure are complex and an unaccompanied child 
can effectively pursue claims for relief before the immigration courts only 
with the assistance of counsel. Second, pending the outcome of immigra-
tion proceedings, a child may have the right to reunification with family 
members in the United States. Third, the conditions in detention facilities 
are often horrendous and appointed counsel would ensure that a child is 
not subjected to inhumane treatment while his or her case is pending. This 
three-fold necessity, in addition to the unique circumstances of unaccom-
panied alien children, gives rise to a constitutional right to counsel. 
Introduction 
 What am I doing here? And how can I get out? These are the two 
basic questions of children detained for days, months, and sometimes 
years by the federal government of the United States.1 When the De-
                                                                                                                      
* M. Dale Palmer Professor of Law and Immigration Clinic Director, Indiana Univer-
sity School of Law. B.A., University of Virginia; J.D., University of Virginia. 
1 As part of a study published on the care and custody of unaccompanied alien chil-
dren, the Women’s Refugee Commission collected statistics on the average length of stay 
for children at the sixty-three federally contracted facilities providing shelter, staff-secure, 
or secure conditions. See Women’s Refugee Comm’n, Statistics (data period Jan. 1, 2005 to 
June 18, 2007) (on file with author). For the statutory definition of unaccompanied alien 
child, see infra note 2 and accompanying text. See also Women’s Refugee Comm’n & Or-
rick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Halfway Home: Unaccompanied Children in 
Immigration Custody 6–8 (2009), available at http://womensrefugeecommission.org/ 
docs/halfway_home.pdf [hereinafter Halfway Home]. 
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partment of Homeland Security (DHS) apprehends an unaccompa-
nied alien child inside the United States or at the border, he or she is 
placed in the care and custody of the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services (HHS).2 The legal interests of an unaccompanied alien 
child in federal custody are threefold, each as pressing as the next.3 
First and most evident are the child’s legal needs as he or she is placed 
in removal proceedings and may pursue claims for relief before an im-
                                                                                                                      
The Women’s Refugee Commission statistics reflect average stays between twelve and 
ninety-nine days for children in the various types of facilities. Women’s Refugee Comm’n, 
Statistics, supra. However, children are sometimes held in DUCS facilities for lengthier pe-
riods. See Linda Kelly Hill, The Right to Know Your Rights: Conflicts of Interest and the Assistance 
of Unaccompanied Alien Children, 14 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 263, 284–88 (2010). The 
author’s experience working with unaccompanied alien children is largely a result of the 
Indiana University Clinic’s work with the children detained at the Southwest Indiana Re-
gional Youth Village (SIRYV) in Vincennes, Indiana. Id. at 265. 
2 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 279 (2006). An unaccompanied alien 
child is a minor child who has no lawful U.S. immigration status and has either no parent 
or legal guardian in the United States or no parent or legal guardian in the United States 
available to provide for his or her care and physical custody. See id. § 279(g)(2). Pursuant 
to the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 
(TVPRA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must notify the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) within forty-eight hours if it has custody of an unac-
companied child and transfer the child to HHS within seventy-two hours. See Pub. L. No. 
110-457, § 235(b)(2)–(3), 122 Stat. 5044, 5077 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1232(b)(2)–(3) (West Supp. 2010)). The TVPRA also requires HHS, in consultation with 
DHS, to develop procedures allowing “prompt determinations” of an alien’s age with evi-
dentiary guidelines. See 8 U.S.C.A § 1232(b)(4). DHS retains its role in prosecuting an 
unaccompanied minor child for removal and returning any child to his home country if 
the United States Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) orders removal. See 
Olga Byrne, Unaccompanied Children in the United States: A Literature Review 
17–19 (2008), available at http://www.vera.org/download?file=1775/UAC%2Bliterature% 
2Breview%2BFINAL.pdf. There are also numerous scholars who have written in detail and 
criticized the responsibilities of DHS regarding alien children prior to further amend-
ments of the TVPRA. See, e.g., id. at 19; Christopher Nugent, Whose Children Are These? To-
wards Ensuring the Best Interests and Empowerment of Unaccompanied Alien Children, 15 B.U. 
Pub. Int. L.J. 219, 229–31 (2006) (discussing DHS’s gatekeeper role); Chad C. Haddal, 
Cong. Research Serv., RL 33896, Unaccompanied Alien Children: Policies and Is-
sues 4–8, 25–27 (2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33896_20070301. 
pdf (discussing DHS’ interpretation of unaccompanied minor child, seventy-two hour 
standard transfer arrangement with the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), and statis-
tics and explanations for violations of the seventy-two hour rule for fiscal years 2005 and 
2006); see also Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 5–12 (discussing DHS’s gatekeeper role); 
Women’s Refugee Comm’n, Statistics, supra note 1 (reporting for calendar years 2005 and 
2006 and through June, 2007 that 93.2%, 95.1%, and 85.7%, respectively, of unaccompa-
nied minors were transferred to ORR custody within seventy-two hours). 
3 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1232(c); Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 58–59; Christine M. Gordon, 
Are Unaccompanied Alien Children Really Getting a Fair Trial? An Overview of Asylum Law and Chil-
dren, 33 Denv. J. Int’l. L. & Pol’y 641, 656–58, 665–68 (2005). 
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migration court.4 Second, pending the outcome of these proceedings, 
an unaccompanied alien child may have the right to be released to his 
or her family.5 Third and equally important is the requirement that de-
tention conditions meet certain minimum standards.6 Thus, an attor-
                                                                                                                      
4 See Gordon, supra note 3, at 641, 656–58, 665–68 (discussing the challenges faced by 
unaccompanied children in removal proceedings). 
5 See 8 U.S.C.A § 1232(c); Nationwide Settlement Regulating INS Treatment of Detained Minors: 
Flores v. Ashcroft, Ctr. for Hum. Rts. & Const. L., http://web.centerforhumanrights.net: 
8080/centerforhumanrights/children/Document.2004-06-18.8124043749 (last visited Jan. 
20, 2011) [hereinafter Flores Stipulated Settlement Agreement]. The TVPRA now re-
quires, at a minimum, that relevant federal agencies establish policies which will ensure safe 
and secure placements for children. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1232(c). The family reunification stan-
dards which have otherwise been relied upon for determining whether an unaccompanied 
minor child is eligible for release are set out in the Flores Settlement. See Flores Stipulated 
Settlement Agreement, supra. The Flores Settlement is a product of Reno v. Flores, a class 
action which challenged both the detention and federal release for immigrant children. See 
507 U.S. 292, 292 (1993); Flores Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra. 
In addition to the two overarching provisos that children should be held in the least 
restrictive setting and treated with dignity, respect, and special concern for their vulner-
ability as minors, the Flores list of custodians includes: (1) a parent, legal guardian, or adult 
relative (sibling, aunt, uncle, or grandparent); (2) an adult individual designated by a par-
ent or guardian; (3) a licensed care program; and (4) other adults or entities when there is 
no other likely alternative to long term detention and no reasonable possibility of family 
reunification. See Flores Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra. 
Government regulations more narrowly dictate the conditions for release. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.3(b) (2010). Pursuant to federal regulations, a child may be released, in order of 
preference, to: (1) a parent, legal guardian, or an adult relative (sibling, aunt, uncle, or 
grandparent) who is not in DHS detention; (2) a parent, legal guardian, or an adult rela-
tive in DHS detention if such adult and child could be released simultaneously; (3) a per-
son designated by the parent or legal guardian via sworn affidavit when such parent or 
legal guardian is outside the country; or (4) in unusual and compelling circumstances, to 
another adult who agrees to care for the child and ensures his or her presence at all sub-
sequent immigration proceedings. See id. 
Compared to the federal regulations, Flores creates a larger group of possible custodi-
ans and omits the necessity of an unusual and compelling circumstance in order to have a 
child released to another adult not designated by the parent. See 507 U.S. at 292–93; 8 
C.F.R. § 236.3(b). There has also been further scholarship into the interplay between Flo-
res, the Flores Settlement, and federal administrative standards. See, e.g., Flores Stipulated 
Settlement Agreement, supra; Byrne, supra note 2, at 20–21; Lara Yoder Nafziger, Protec-
tion or Persecution?: The Detention of Unaccompanied Immigrant Children in the United States, 28 
Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 357, 364–75, 379–85 (2006); Nugent, supra note 2, at 223–24. 
6 See Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 58–59. DUCS facilities can largely be separated 
into three groups based upon the level of security provided: shelter, staff-secure, and se-
cure. Shelter care is the least restrictive setting provided to children who cannot be re-
leased or placed in foster care but who do not need a higher level of supervision or ser-
vices. Id. at 56–57. Staff-secure care is designated for children who require close 
supervision but who do not need placement in a secure facility. Id. at 57. Pursuant to the 
DUCS Manual, a secure placement is necessary for children who: (1) are charged with or 
convicted of a crime or adjudicated as delinquent; (2) have committed or threatened acts 
of crime or violence while in DUCS custody; (3) have engaged in unacceptably disruptive 
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ney’s representation is not limited to removal proceedings, but also in-
cludes reunification and detention matters. 
 This Article argues that this threefold necessity, combined with an 
evaluation of existing conditions of care and custody, compels the rec-
ognition of a constitutional due process right to counsel for unaccom-
panied alien children. This guarantee should be applied on a class-wide 
basis to protect all unaccompanied alien children who have entered the 
United Sates and cannot otherwise secure representation during immi-
gration proceedings. Arguing on behalf of unaccompanied alien chil-
dren as a group rather than as individuals tests the framework that 
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services grafted upon Gideon v. Wainwright 
for all civil litigants.7 Yet, rather than pitting one group of aliens de-
manding public counsel against another, this Article evaluates the 
broad recognition of an unaccompanied alien child’s need for counsel, 
the failure of political efforts to secure such representation, and how 
protecting this right benefits not only unaccompanied alien children, 
but also the state. Part I provides an overview of the current conditions 
of care and custody provided to unaccompanied alien children and the 
political limits of efforts to secure them counsel. Part II reviews the 
Gideon landscape applicable to all civil litigants in search of counsel, 
and Part III argues for the recognition of a constitutional right to coun-
sel for unaccompanied alien children. 
                                                                                                                      
acts; (4) are a flight risk; or (5) need extra security for their own protection. Id. Therapeu-
tic and foster care settings are also provided. Id. While distinguishing “shelter” and “staff-
secure” placement standards remains within the purview of DUCS, there are statutory 
standards for determining which children require placement in a secure facility. See 8 
U.S.C.A. § 1232(c)(2) (“A child shall not be placed in a secure facility absent a determina-
tion that the child poses a danger to self or others or has been charged with having com-
mitted a criminal offense.”); Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 57. 
Regardless of the level of security, all facilities must meet both state licensing and ORR 
requirements. Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 92 n.241. These standards set guidelines 
for matters such as physical care and maintenance, education, health services, socializa-
tion, recreation, and family contact. See Flores Stipulated Settlement Agreement, 
supra note 5 (referencing the Minimum Standards for Licensed Programs in Exhibit 1); 
Kelly Hill, supra note 1, at 275–80; see also Haddal, supra note 2, at 9 (identifying the na-
ture of DHS and ORR detention facilities). 
7 See generally Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that the con-
stitution does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every paren-
tal status termination proceeding); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (finding 
that an indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution in a state court has the right to have 
counsel appointed to him pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
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I. The Care, Custody and Representation of Unaccompanied 
Alien Children 
 Since 2003, the number of unaccompanied alien children in cus-
tody has increased 225%.8 This population growth coincided with the 
passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) and its transfer of 
the responsibility for the care and custody of unaccompanied alien chil-
dren from the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) to the HHS Director of Office of Refugee Resettlement 
(ORR).9 This statutory mandate prompted ORR to create a new divi-
                                                                                                                      
8 Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 84 n.9. In 2002, approximately 5000 children were 
subject to detention; by 2007, 8300 children were in ORR custody. Id. at 4. The last year 
unaccompanied children were in INS custody was 2002. See id. The rates of custody have 
grown since DUCS assumed responsibility. See id. In 2003, DUCS’s first operational year, 
DUCS detained approximately 5000 children; in 2004, 6200; in 2005, 7800; in 2006, 7750. 
See Haddal, supra note 2, at 23 (reporting statistics by fiscal year). The Women’s Commis-
sion provides comparable statistics. It reports that in calendar year 2005, 7332 unaccom-
panied minors were subject to ORR detention; in 2006, 7657; and for the first half of 2007, 
3443. See Women’s Refugee Comm’n, Statistics, supra note 1. 
Scholars Jacqueline Bhabha and Susan Schmidt have examined the increased migra-
tory trends of unaccompanied (defined herein as “entirely alone”) and separated (defined 
herein as “in the company of non-parental adults”) minors to the United States and com-
parison to similar trends in other global regions. See Jacqueline Bhabha & Susan Schmidt, 
Seeking Asylum Alone: Unaccompanied and Separated Children and Refugee Protection in the U.S., 1 
J. Hist. Childhood & Youth 126, 129, 131–34 (2008). While Bhabha and Schmidt’s arti-
cle focuses on unaccompanied children in ORR care and custody, the figures provided for 
all “unauthorized alien juveniles” (not specifically unaccompanied minors) who are ap-
prehended by DHS are noteworthy. See id. at 129. For the fiscal years 2001–2006, DHS ap-
prehended over 86,000 children every year. See Haddal, supra note 2, at 22. Approximately 
four out of every five of those apprehended in border sectors are nationals of Mexico. Id. 
at 21. The disparity between the number of children apprehended by DHS and children 
put in ORR detention is largely explained by children opting for immediate repatriation 
or being released to family in the United States. See id. at 30–32; see also Kelly Hill, supra 
note 1, at 268–69 n.13 (describing the repatriation policies uniquely applicable to Mexican 
and Canadian aliens). 
It should also be recognized that children may be detained by DHS if detained with 
their family or otherwise considered “accompanied.” Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 4. 
While reporting on such children and DHS detention conditions, the Women’s Refugee 
Commission was unable to obtain complete information from DHS regarding the number 
or whereabouts of such children. Id. 
9 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 279(a) (2006). Among its other provi-
sions, the Homeland Security Act created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and eliminated INS, thereby completely restructuring the executive branch’s immigration 
duties and lines of authority. Id. §§ 111(a), 542(a). The Act also consolidated other agen-
cies responsible for homeland security, such as the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Transportation Security Administration, and 
the Customs Services, under DHS. Id. § 542(a); see also Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff et 
al., Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy 268–78 (6th ed. 2008) (discuss-
ing the Homeland Security Act and its amendments); Ira J. Kurzban, Immigration Law 
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sion, the Department of Unaccompanied Children’s Services (DUCS), 
which provides for the care and placement of unaccompanied alien 
children by contracting with private facilities.10 The William Wilberforce 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) clarifies 
any ambiguity regarding lines of authority by designating the responsi-
bility for the care and custody of unaccompanied alien children to the 
Secretary of HHS.11 
 These two factors—the growing number of detained children and 
the restructuring of federal immigration agencies—motivated the 
Women’s Refugee Commission of the non-profit International Rescue 
Commission (Women’s Commission) to study the developments.12 In 
February 2009, the Women’s Commission released a report entitled 
Halfway Home: Unaccompanied Children in Immigration Custody.13 The re-
port is based primarily on visits by the Women’s Commission to thirty 
DUCS facilities and on interviews with more than two hundred chil-
dren.14 In its findings and recommendations, the Women’s Commission 
acknowledges that HHS is the “federal entity best suited to maintain cus-
tody of children in immigration proceedings” and that children have 
“greatly benefitted” from the transfer of custody from INS to ORR.15 
                                                                                                                      
Sourcebook 16–17 (12th ed. 2010); Stephen H. Legomsky & Cristina M. Rodríguez, 
Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 2–6 (5th ed. 2009). 
10 Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 12–14. Created in March 2003, DUCS began with a 
budget of approximately thirty-five million dollars and seven staff members. Id. at 14. By 
fiscal year 2008, the program’s projected budget reportedly grew to $132.6 million, with 
eighteen employees at its headquarters and eleven others spread out across the country. 
Id. At the local level, DUCS field employees work with the private facilities to ensure care 
meets appropriate standards. See id. For a review of the quality of care provided and exist-
ing standards, see infra notes 12–25 and accompanying text. 
11 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1232(b)(1). 
12 Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 1. The study was conducted and authored by the 
Women’s Commission and the private law firm of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP. See id. 
at 3–4. In 2002, the Women’s Commission reported on the former treatment of unaccompa-
nied children by INS. See generally Women’s Comm’n for Refugee Women & Children, Prison 
Guard or Parent?: INS Treatment of Unaccompanied Refugee Children, Women’s Refugee Comm’n, 
1–3 (2002), http://womensrefugeecommission.org/programs/detention/55-detention/81-
unaccompanied-alien-children-and-family-detention (reviewing a multi-state assessment of 
detention facilities used by the INS to detain children and concluding that there is a signifi-
cant disregard for the rights and needs of children seeking asylum and other young new-
comers). 
13 See Halfway Home, supra note 1, at i. 
14 Id. at 1. The Commission also visited three Border Patrol facilities and three ICE fa-
cilities where children may be detained, but were not able to interview children at all the 
DHS facilities. Id. The report is also based upon interviews and contact with individuals 
within all three relevant federal agencies, the staff of DUCS contracted facilities, and pri-
vate counsel. Id. at 4, 40. 
15 Id. at 38. 
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 Nevertheless, the problems surrounding detention, reunification, 
and removal persist. The failure of DUCS to abandon the former INS 
model of “prosecutor and caretaker” contributes significantly to these 
problems.16 Additionally, by maintaining DUCS facilities in remote areas 
to ease the transfer of children from DHS, DUCS effectively prevents 
critical access to children by family and other necessary visitors such as 
doctors, lawyers, and teachers.17 DUCS also fails to regularly adhere to 
the “least restrictive setting” standard, over-relies on the more restrictive 
“staff-secure and secure facilities that are wholly inappropriate for most 
unaccompanied children,” and fails to regularly assess whether children 
can be “stepped down” to lower security facilities or released.18 
 Furthermore, the Women’s Commission reports that the detention 
facilities contracting with DUCS do not consistently follow proper poli-
cies and procedures.19 Some facilities were “dreary, harsh, violated 
standards and/or were overly restrictive.”20 In two extreme cases, both 
of which occurred in Texas, facilities were closed due to incidents of 
sexual abuse and physical mistreatment of children by the facilities’ 
staff.21 At the Southwest Indiana Regional Youth Village (SIRYV) in 
Vincennes, Indiana, the facility’s staff subjected children to numerous, 
extreme forms of corporal punishment, including physically binding 
children and leaving them in isolation for days.22 These kinds of deten-
tion problems and abuses are exacerbated by the failure of DUCS to 
develop any type of effective, independent oversight.23 Children are 
further prevented from being properly released or reunified because 
                                                                                                                      
16 Id. at 14. 
17 Id. 
18 Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 18, 57. 
19 Id. at 35–36. 
20 Id. at 25. 
21 Id. at 27–30. In 2007, DUCS terminated its contract with the Texas Sheltered Care 
Facility in Nixon, Texas (Nixon), due to repeated allegations of sexual, physical and emo-
tional abuse and the conviction of a staff member in connection with such allegations. Id. 
DUCS also terminated its contract with the Abraxas Hector Garza Center (Hector Garza) 
located in San Antonio, Texas, after repeated reports of physical abuse. Id. at 28, 30. 
22 See id. at 28. In 2010, SIRYV stopped serving as a DUCS facility. See Kelly Hill, supra 
note 1, at 281 n.55. The Indiana University Immigration Clinic is involved with the chil-
dren at SIRYV and abuse incidents are reported by the Women’s Commission. See id. at 
280–88. 
23 See Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 14, 33, 38. In each of the most severe accounts 
of abuse at Nixon, Hector Garza, and SIRYV, communication failures between the facilities 
and ORR aggravated the problems at the facilities. See id. at 27–28, 30 (reporting on the 
communication failure between ORR and the facilities in all three cases); Kelly Hill, supra 
note 1, at 286 (reporting that ORR learned of the abuse through a report by the Indiana 
University Immigration Clinic). 
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DUCS and DHS continue to “inconsistently and, at times, incorrectly” 
interpret the definition of “unaccompanied.”24 Frustrated and con-
fused by the legal process and by prolonged, overly harsh detention 
conditions, children often accept the only alternative: deportation.25 
 The unaccompanied child’s need for legal counsel is clear.26 Rec-
ognizing the conditions unaccompanied alien children face, the HSA 
requires ORR to assist children by ensuring “that qualified and inde-
pendent legal counsel is timely appointed to represent the interests of 
each such child, consistent with the law.”27 This requirement is artfully 
crafted to avoid violating the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 
which prohibits the expenditure of government funds on providing 
public counsel for aliens in removal proceedings.28 
 In 2005, ORR began the Unaccompanied Children Program in an 
effort to balance these competing policies.29 Through funding pro-
                                                                                                                      
24 See Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 8. 
25 See id. at 23. 
26 See id. Numerous sources recognize the acute need for legal representation of unac-
companied children. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 2, at 34; Bhabha & Schmidt, supra note 8, 
at 128–31; Sharon Finkel, Voice of Justice: Promoting Fairness Through Appointed Counsel for 
Immigrant Children, 17 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 1105, 1105–07 (2001); Nugent, supra note 
2, at 226–28; Raya Jarawan, Note, Young, Illegal, and Unaccompanied: One Step Short of Legal 
Protection, 14 Wash. & Lee J. Civ. Rts. & Soc. Just. 125, 126 (2007); Nina Bernstein, Chil-
dren Alone and Scared, Fighting Deportation, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2004, at N1; Haddal, supra 
note 2, at 15–16. For further statutory emphasis on the unaccompanied child’s need for 
counsel under the TVPRA, see infra, note 45 and accompanying text. 
27 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1) (2006). 
28 See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006)(“In any removal proceedings . . . the person concerned 
shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such 
counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose.”). 
29See Unaccompanied Children Program, Vera Inst. of Just., http://www.vera.org/project/ 
unaccompanied-children-program (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). In fiscal year 2007, additional 
government funding also allowed for a one-year pilot “Legal Orientation Program” (LOP), 
which enabled ORR to award four LOP contracts to agencies working with unaccompanied 
alien children. See Kelly Hill, supra note 1, at 273–74. The children’s LOP program was mod-
eled on the LOP program for adults facing removal. Id. at 284–85. Begun in 2003, the adult 
LOP serves twenty-five detention facilities throughout the country. Id. at 277. The program 
offers the following: 
four levels of service: group orientations (presentations conducted by attor-
neys or paralegals regarding the removal process and relief available); indi-
vidual orientations (screenings by LOP attorneys or paralegals in order to re-
view individual claims and answer questions confidentially); self-help 
workshops (small “how to” sessions to instruct individuals preparing for their 
hearings); and pro bono attorney referrals (provided for some detainees who 
are unable to proceed pro se or are otherwise identified as in particular need 
of counsel. 
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vided by Congress to the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(EOIR), the Vera Institute operates pro bono legal programs for both 
adults and children.30 In each case, non-profit organizations contract 
with the Vera Institute and are responsible for finding pro bono attor-
neys for otherwise unrepresented individuals.31 While the children’s 
program was initially based at a limited number of detention sites 
around the country, Congress increased funding in 2008 to ensure that 
all facilities have a legal service organization to assist detained and un-
accompanied alien children.32 Notably, in December 2009, the Catholic 
Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC) launched the National Pro 
Bono Project for Children.33 The project coordinates a national effort 
to match released children with pro bono attorneys.34 Other agencies 
receiving non-federal funding are also involved in the effort to provide 
representation to unaccompanied alien children.35 
 Despite the wide variety of pro bono projects, the Women’s Com-
mission estimated that sixty percent of all children are unrepresented in 
immigration proceedings.36 Twenty-five percent of those who remain in 
DUCS custody continue to lack representation, along with sixty percent 
of those expected to be released and seventy percent of those actually 
                                                                                                                      
Id. at 271 n.19 (citing Nina Siulc et al., Legal Orientation Program: Evaluation and 
Performance and Outcome Measurement Report, Phase II, at 19–24 (2008), available at 
http://www.vera.org/download?file=1778/LOP%2Bevaluation_updated%2B5-20-08.pdf). 
30 See Center on Immigration and Justice, Vera Inst. of Just. http://www.vera.org/centers/ 
center-immigration-justice (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
31 See Kelly Hill, supra note 1, at 293–94. Pro bono representation arranged via such 
contractual arrangements can raise conflicts of interest and other potential problems. See 
id. at 293–308; infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
32 See Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 22. 
33 See Press Release, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc., CLINIC to Match Un-
accompanied Minors with Free Legal Services, http://www.cliniclegal.org/news/0912/ 
clinic-match-unaccompanied-minors-free-legal-services (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). This 
project is also funded by ORR through a contract with the Vera Institute. See id. 
34 See National Pro Bono Project for Children, Catholic Legal Immigr. Network, Inc., 
http://www.cliniclegal.org/pro-bono-kids (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
35 See Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 22. Two additional agencies are engaged in 
broad-based efforts to provide free legal representation to detained children. See id. The 
National Children’s Center, a program of the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immi-
grants, has adopted a pro bono model and aspires to find representation for about thirty 
percent of children released to a non-parental sponsor. Id. In 2008, Kids in Need of De-
fense (KIND) began operations with sites in the Northeast corridor, Los Angeles, Houston, 
and Seattle. Id. Also based on the pro bono referral model, it hopes to develop offices 
throughout the country. Id. 
36 Id. at 23. It should be noted that the Women’s Commission published this estimate 
before organizations such as CLINIC, KIND, and the National Children’s Center began 
providing detained children with representation. See id. at 22; Press Release, Catholic Legal 
Immigration Network, supra note 33. 
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released.37 Based on these findings, the report concludes that “there is 
no well-coordinated, well-funded program that is able to operate on a 
national level to cover all areas where children are detained or need re-
presentation.”38 Recent funding of CLINIC’s national program may 
provide additional representation for released unaccompanied alien 
children, however the project’s explicit focus on released children will 
prevent it from providing critical assistance to detained children.39 
Thus, as the Women’s Commission concludes, reliance on pro bono 
and pro se services “is not sufficient given the individualized needs of 
children and children’s developmental capacity and is not an effective 
mechanism for ensuring the representation of all children in custody.”40 
 This conclusion is consistent with the TVPRA.41 The TVPRA cor-
rects many of the insufficiencies brought to light by the Women’s 
Commission report.42 Among its most important provisions, the TVPRA 
codifies the “least restrictive setting” standard of detention,43 places fur-
ther restrictions on the use of “secure” detention,44 and reiterates the 
earlier statutory definition of “unaccompanied minor child.”45 It also 
mandates that HHS “ensure, to the greatest extent practicable,” that 
unaccompanied minor children in custody have counsel to represent 
                                                                                                                      
37 See Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 22–23. 
38 Id. at 22. 
39 See Press Release, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, supra note 33. 
40 See Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 23. In 2008, the DUCS Pro Bono Project re-
ceived a five million dollar increase to ensure unaccompanied children’s access to legal 
representation at every facility and upon their release. See id. at 22. 
41 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1232(c)(5) (West Supp. 2010). 
42 See id. 
43 Id. § 1232(c)(2). With regard to safe and secure placements, this section provides 
the following: 
[A]n unaccompanied alien child in the custody of the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services shall be promptly placed in the least restrictive setting 
that is in the best interest of the child. In making such placements, the Secre-
tary may consider danger to self, danger to the community, and risk of flight. 
Id. 
44 Id. Section 1232(c)(2) goes on to note: 
A child shall not be placed in a secure facility absent a determination that the 
child poses a danger to self or others or has been charged with having com-
mitted a criminal offense. The placement of a child in a secure facility shall 
be reviewed, at a minimum, on a monthly basis, in accordance with proce-
dures prescribed by the Secretary, to determine if such placement remains 
warranted. 
Id. 
45 Id. § 1232(g) (“The term ‘unaccompanied alien child’ has the meaning given such 
term in section 279(g) of [the Homeland Security Act of 2002].”). 
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them.46 Other provisions require EOIR to provide familial custodians of 
released children with legal orientation programs47 and to seek the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem for particularly “vulnerable” unac-
companied alien children.48 
 Although the TVPRA recognizes the urgent need for advocates to 
represent the interests of unaccompanied alien children, it fails to im-
plement the recommendation of the Women’s Commission that coun-
sel be provided by statute for all children unable to secure paid or pro 
bono counsel.49 This type of political plea on behalf of unaccompanied 
alien children is not new.50 Moreover, within the diverse immigrant 
population, unaccompanied alien children are not the only group in 
need of appointed counsel—lawful permanent residents facing removal 
and asylum seekers also require public legal assistance.51 Despite the 
                                                                                                                      
46 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1232(c)(5). 
The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall ensure, to the greatest ex-
tent practicable and consistent with section 292 of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1362), that all unaccompanied alien children who are 
or have been in the custody of the Secretary or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, and who are not described in subsection (a)(2)(A) [children of con-
tiguous countries], have counsel to represent them in legal proceedings or 
matters and protect them from mistreatment, exploitation, and trafficking. 
To the greatest extent practicable, the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices shall make every effort to utilize the services of pro bono counsel who 
agree to provide representation to such children without charge. 
Id. 
47 Id. § 1232(c)(4). Custodians shall receive “legal orientation presentations . . . admin-
istered by the Executive Office for Immigration Review. At a minimum, such presentations 
shall address the custodian’s responsibility to attempt to ensure the child’s appearance at 
all immigration proceedings and to protect the child from mistreatment, exploitation, and 
trafficking.” Id. 
48 Id. § 1232(c)(6) (“The Secretary of Health and Human Services is authorized to ap-
point independent child advocates for child trafficking victims and other vulnerable unac-
companied alien children.”). 
49 See Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 23. Most fundamentally, the Women’s Commis-
sion insisted that DUCS abandon the former INS structure in favor of a structure consis-
tent with “the best interest principle and general child welfare practices.” See id. at 38. 
Other recommendations included adhering to the “least restrictive setting” standard; ex-
panding the use of less secure facilities (such as foster care and group home settings); 
expanding the use of therapeutic facilities; limiting the use of secure facilities to danger-
ous children; increasing the follow-up services to those released; ending information shar-
ing between DUCS and DHS to maintain confidentiality; and moving DUCS facilities to 
more urban areas. See id. 
50 See, e.g., Jarawan, supra note 26, at 135–36 (making a statutory argument for public 
counsel on behalf of immigrant children). 
51 Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and Ad-
ministrative Reform, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1647, 1694–95 (1997) (reporting arguments that lawful 
 
52 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 31:41 
good intentions behind the pro bono model, its inadequacy is unsur-
prising. The limited nature of pro bono legal services for aliens is con-
sistent with the overall paucity of pro bono legal offerings.52 Less than 
ten percent of lawyers accept pro bono cases and financial contributions 
from lawyers for pro bono services amount to less than fifty cents a day.53 
 Given that the prospect of securing public counsel for unaccompa-
nied alien children through political channels remains bleak, whether a 
constitutional right to counsel exists must be considered—or more ac-
curately, reconsidered. Constitutional arguments on behalf of unac-
companied alien children have been raised both in the courts and in 
the academy.54 So-called “Civil Gideon” cries also come from other 
groups facing removal as well as numerous groups litigating in a variety 
of other civil contexts.55 
                                                                                                                      
permanent residents facing deportation, non-frivolous asylum seekers, and unaccompanied 
minors are three immigrant groups deemed in greatest need of public counsel). 
52 See, e.g., Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 Geo. J. 
Legal Ethics 369, 371 (2004); Taylor, supra note 51, at 1696. 
53 See Rhode, supra note 52, at 378 n.13. The inability of pro bono attorneys to serve the 
needs of detained adults has also been recently reported. See City Bar Justice Ctr., NYC Know 
Your Rights Project: An Innovative Pro Bono Response to the Lack of Counsel for Indigent Immigrant 
Detainees, N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n 8–11, 15–16 (2009), http://www.nycbar.org/citybarjusticecen- 
ter/pdf/NYC_KnowYourRightsNov09.pdf (concluding that despite efforts by the many pro 
bono agencies in New York to provide pro bono representation to adult aliens detained at 
New York City’s Varick Street Detention Facility, representation remains inadequate and ne-
cessitates government funded, publicly appointed counsel); see also Peter L. Markowitz, Barri-
ers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A 
Case Study, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 541, 541–46, 572 (2009) (examining how the lack of quality 
legal representation has a detrimental impact on the deportation system); Nina Bernstein, 
Immigrant Jail Tests U.S. View of Legal Access, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 2009, at A1 (noting that immi-
grant detainees with a legitimate claim to stay in the United States are often “held without 
legal representation and moved from state to state without notice”). 
54 See, e.g., Perez-Funez v. Dist. Dir., INS, 619 F. Supp. 656, 659–60 (C.D. Cal. 1985); 
Beth J. Werlin, Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed Counsel in Deportation Proceed-
ings, 20 B.C. Third World L.J. 393, 394–95 (2000). In two key cases where public counsel 
arguments on behalf of unaccompanied alien children were potentially at issue, they were 
not squarely addressed. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 315 (1993) (reviewed and re-
manded on issues of detention and release conditions); Perez-Funez, 619 F. Supp. at 659 
(stating in dicta that there is no right to public counsel and limiting the legal challenge to 
the provision of a list of legal services and child’s understanding of voluntary departure). 
But see Finkel, supra note 26, at 1116–27 (providing an example of an academic argument 
in favor of a constitutional right to counsel for immigrant children). 
55 See, e.g., Werlin, supra note 54, at 394–95. There is also a constitutional argument in 
favor of public counsel for aliens. See Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 571–72 (6th 
Cir. 1975) (DeMascio, J., dissenting) (finding an “unqualified right to the appointment of 
counsel” for lawful permanent residents facing removal); see also Werlin, supra note 54, at 
395 (reviewing the right to public counsel arguments made on behalf of various immigrant 
groups). 
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II. Civil Gideon and Unaccompanied Alien Children 
 Why argue that there is a right to counsel only for unaccompanied 
alien children, and not for all unrepresented aliens? For individuals 
throughout our civil litigation system, the need for counsel remains 
largely unmet.56 In September 2009, the Legal Services Corporation 
(LSC), the country’s largest provider of funding for civil legal services 
for low-income individuals, issued a report in which it projected that 
one million people—nearly half of those seeking LSC’s legal assis-
tance—would be turned away in the coming year because of insuffi-
cient resources.57 Despite efforts to increase access to justice through a 
variety of measures, including increasing private and non-government 
funding for civil attorneys and increasing the availability of pro se legal 
                                                                                                                      
In other civil proceedings, Civil Gideon efforts are widespread. See, e.g., Deborah Gard-
ner, Justice Delayed Is, Once Again, Justice Denied: The Overdue Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 
U. Balt. L. Rev. 59, 59–60 (2007) (discussing the right to public counsel for litigants in 
adversarial cases involving basic human needs); Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, Pub. Just. 
Center, http://www.publicjustice.org/our-work/index.cfm?pageid=88 (last visited Jan. 
20, 2011) (describing that a mainstay of the Public Justice Center’s mission is to achieve 
Civil Gideon rights in all civil disputes involving fundamental interests and basic rights). See 
generally Simran Bindra & Pedram Ben-Cohen, Public Civil Defenders: A Right to Counsel for 
Indigent Civil Defendants, 10 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 1 (2003) (providing academic 
discussions of Civil Gideon efforts in non-immigration contexts, such as the right to public 
counsel for civil defendants); Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel 
for Children in Civil Litigation, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1571 (1996) (analyzing the right to pub-
lic counsel for children). 
56 See Rhode, supra note 52, at 371. Immigration matters are traditionally treated as civ-
il matters. See Yafang Deng, Note, When Procedure Equals Justice: Facing the Pressing Constitu-
tional Needs of a Criminalized Immigration System, 42 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 261, 281–92 
(2008) (describing issues arising from the civil-criminal dichotomy in immigration law); 
infra note 102 (citing cases). 
57 See Documenting the Justice Gap in America: The Current Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-
Income Americans, Legal Servs. Corp., 5 (2009), http://www.lsc.gov/pdfs/documenting_ 
the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf; see also John Schwartz, Cash Squeeze Said to Deny Legal 
Aid to Poor, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2009, at A22 (noting that due to a lack of sufficient financ-
ing, legal aid clinics must “turn away two people for each one they can help”); Press Re-
lease, Legal Servs. Corp., LSC Releases Updated Report on the Justice Gap in America 
(Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.lsc.gov/press/pressrelease_detail_2009_T248_R27.php (reaf-
firming the conclusion reached in the 2005 report issued by Legal Services Corporation 
(LSC) that nearly fifty percent of the organization’s potential clients seeking assistance 
with civil legal problems would not be served due to insufficient resources). The 2005 and 
2009 reports did not improve upon LSC’s 2001 finding that four-fifths of low-income indi-
viduals’ civil legal needs are unmet. See Rhode, supra note 52, at 377 n.12 (citing Annual 
Report 2000–2001: Progress in the New Millennium, Legal Servs. Corp., http://www.lsc.gov/ 
pdfs/LSC_2000-2001_Annual_Report.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2011)); Documenting the Jus-
tice Gap in America: The Current Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans, supra. 
54 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 31:41 
services, “the poor, overall, have barely held their ground.”58 The sub-
stantial, unmet legal needs of the middle-class are also, in part, attrib-
uted to a lack of affordable counsel.59 
 The reality of limited access to civil counsel is contrary to the pub-
lic’s perceptions and ideals.60 While the right to counsel theoretically 
exists in the civil context, it bears little resemblance to the more famil-
iar criminal guarantee.61 Since Gideon v. Wainwright first trumpeted the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants, 
the right has been extended to all individuals charged with criminal 
offenses that result in imprisonment.62 On the civil side, developments 
have been neither as rapid nor as foolproof. Mathews v. Eldridge estab-
lishes the now well-known due process calculus that may create a Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel in some civil litigation circumstances.63 
 Lassiter v. Department of Social Services adds a layer of complexity to 
such due process claims.64 Under Lassiter, the analysis begins with the 
negative presumption that no right to counsel exists unless physical 
confinement may result from losing the litigation.65 By raising the civil 
                                                                                                                      
58 See Gardner, supra note 55, at 64–65. But see Rhode, supra note 52, at 392–421 (pro-
viding a counter argument in favor of continuing to find innovative means to improve 
access to justice). 
59 See Rhode, supra note 52, at 397–98. Although finding the extent of the middle-
class’s unmet legal needs “difficult to quantify,” Deborah Rhode reports in her 2004 article 
that two-thirds of middle-class Americans do not take their cases to a lawyer or the legal 
system. Id. 
60 See id. at 377–78. Eighty percent of the public favors taxpayer-funded lawyers in cer-
tain critical civil practices, such as domestic violence, child abuse, veteran’s benefits, and 
health care for seniors. See id. at 377. This finding is consistent with other surveys that find 
eighty percent of the public is reported to believe (albeit erroneously) that the constitu-
tional guarantee of legal representation extends to civil as well as criminal matters. See id. 
at 371. 
61 See id. at 375. 
62 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 339–40 (1963); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (finding no con-
stitutional right to counsel when imprisonment is not actually imposed); Ross v. Moffitt, 
417 U.S. 600, 619 (1974) (denying right to public counsel in discretionary criminal ap-
peals). See generally Anthony D. Lewis, Gideon’s Trumpet (1964) (providing the general 
story behind Clarence Earl Gideon’s landmark victory). 
63 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (requiring due process assurances 
to be determined based upon balancing the private interests at stake against the possible 
value added by additional procedural safeguards and the cost the additional process would 
impose upon the government). 
64 See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981). 
65 Id. at 25. Theoretically, failure to establish the possibility of loss of physical liberty 
does not preclude a successful appointed counsel argument. Instead, it shifts the burden 
to the party requesting counsel to “overcome the presumption against the right to ap-
pointed counsel” by making a strong showing on the Eldridge factors. Id. at 31. Evaluating 
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standard, “Lassiter all but shut the door to progress on achieving a 
broad civil right to counsel, at least for a time.”66 A case-by-case review 
of state appellate decisions citing Lassiter shows that requests for ap-
pointed counsel are usually denied.67 In short, Lassiter is “[t]he biggest 
stumbling block” for civil litigants in need of counsel.68 Generally 
speaking, the unique vulnerabilities of children in legal proceedings 
have been given little attention.69 The decision in In re Gault stands as a 
notable exception: where the potential of being institutionalized put a 
child’s physical liberty at stake, the juvenile successfully argued for the 
appointment of counsel during juvenile commitment proceedings.70 
                                                                                                                      
the Eldridge factors in the context of a parental termination proceeding, the Court found 
the following: 
If, in a given case, the parent’s interests were at their strongest, the State’s in-
terests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak, it could 
not be said that the Eldridge factors did not overcome the presumption against 
the right to appointed counsel, and that due process did not therefore re-
quire the appointment of counsel. 
See id. Lassiter justifies adding the initial presumption measure to the Eldridge analysis in 
Fifth Amendment appointed counsel challenges in order to maintain consistency with the 
Sixth Amendment’s limited guarantee of counsel to criminal defendants facing analogous 
curtailments of physical liberty. See id. at 25. 
The heightened protection provided by due process when personal liberty is at risk is 
criticized for presuming that personal liberty is always more important than property in-
terests and for creating a false dichotomy between personal liberty and property. See, e.g., 
Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 55, at 11–13; Gardner, supra note 55, at 73. 
66 Gardner, supra note 55, at 64. 
67 Id. 
68 See Taylor, supra note 51, at 1663. There are, however, strong criticisms of Lassiter’s 
negative presumption. See Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 55, at 2 (“[Lassiter’s] presump-
tion has proved nearly impossible to overcome, and led to the widespread notion that ap-
pointment of counsel in a civil case is ‘a privilege and not a right.’” (quoting United States 
v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965))); Gardner, supra note 55, at 64 (recognizing 
a virtually insurmountable hurdle created by Lassiter). 
69 See Ross, supra note 55, at 1579. Ross also outlines additional considerations of an 
unaccompanied child’s age and capacity in arguing for a right to appointed counsel and 
points out that children have unique vulnerabilities that entitle them to counsel in a broad 
array of civil suits. See id. at 1598–99. 
70 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967). In this case the Court stated: 
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires that in respect to proceedings to determine delinquency which may re-
sult in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile’s freedom is cur-
tailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child’s right to be 
represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford 
counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child. 
Id. 
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III. The Constitutional Argument for the Right to Counsel for 
Unaccompanied Alien children 
 Against this backdrop, what constitutional headway can be made 
for unaccompanied alien children? As an initial matter, aliens appre-
hended inside of the United States, regardless of how they entered, 
possess the same due process rights as American citizens.71 Although no 
alien has ever been provided public counsel during removal proceed-
ings, the analysis for deciding whether to provide counsel is identical to 
that employed in other civil contexts.72 Thus, even though Lassiter is a 
“stumbling block” for unaccompanied alien children, the standard is 
no higher than that faced by other individuals.73 However, Lassiter also 
warns that the due process mandate of “fundamental fairness” requires 
evaluating each “particular situation.”74 Consequently, notwithstanding 
the formidable test, the conditions of care and custody faced by unac-
companied alien children, combined with their minor age and lack of 
capacity, make for a compelling constitutional argument.75 
                                                                                                                      
71 See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (first recognizing the procedural due 
process rights of aliens who have entered the United States). Later cases have continued to 
recognize the rights of aliens who have entered the United States as well as certain lawful 
permanent residents who have left the United States. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 
U.S. 21, 36–37 (1982) (extending procedural due process protection to a returning lawful 
permanent resident with a brief departure); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) 
(“Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled 
to [Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment] protection.”); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“[A]liens who have once passed through our gates, even 
illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of 
fairness encompassed in due process of law.”); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 
596 (1953) (analogizing status of returning lawful permanent resident to continuously 
present alien, thus entitling him to same procedural rights). 
By contrast, there are no procedural due process safeguards for nonpermanent resident 
aliens who have not entered the country. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 
U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as 
far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”). See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evo-
lution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1625 (1992) (discussing the significance of these procedural rights). 
72 See Finkel, supra note 26, at 1121–22; Taylor, supra note 51, at 1663; Werlin, supra 
note 54, at 402; Jarawan, supra note 26, at 141. In Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, the Sixth Circuit 
denied a request for public counsel because “[c]ounsel could have obtained no different 
administrative result.” 516 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1975). The court articulated the applica-
ble standard: “The test for whether due process requires the appointment of counsel for 
an indigent alien is whether, in a given case, the assistance of counsel would be necessary 
to provide ‘fundamental fairness the touchstone of due process.’” Id. at 568 (quoting Gag-
non v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)). 
73 See Taylor, supra note 51, at 1663. 
74 See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981). 
75 See id.; Bernstein, supra note 26. 
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A. The Initial Presumption: The Deprivation of Physical Liberty 
 At first blush, an unaccompanied alien child may seem stymied by 
Lassiter’s first requirement of showing a loss to physical liberty as a con-
sequence of losing the underlying litigation.76 As the Attorney Gen-
eral’s reading of Lassiter asserts, while an alien may be detained during 
his removal proceedings, he does not “lose his physical liberty” based 
on the proceeding’s outcome.77 “[T]he point of the proceeding is not 
to determine or provide the basis for incarceration or an equivalent 
deprivation of physical liberty, but rather to determine whether the 
alien is entitled to live freely in the United States or must be released 
elsewhere.”78 Such an interpretation of Lassiter fails in several important 
respects and does not truly account for the representational needs of 
an unaccompanied alien.79 
 As an initial matter, an alien in removal proceedings does not al-
ways confront a decision between living freely in the United States or 
being released elsewhere.80 Certain aliens with a final order of removal 
who cannot be physically removed or safely released in the United 
States may be subject to prolonged detention.81 But more importantly, 
an application of Lassiter to unaccompanied alien children must recog-
nize that they have a threefold need for counsel.82 Certainly, an unac-
companied alien child’s most evident need is representation in the 
course of removal proceedings.83 Representation is also critical to as-
sure a child’s right to release during proceedings and his or her right to 
minimal conditions of detention.84 
 Arguably, the Supreme Court has otherwise qualified a child’s phys-
ical liberty interests and thereby undercut efforts to claim a right to 
counsel on those grounds.85 In both the immigration and non-immigra-
                                                                                                                      
76 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26–27. 
77 See In re Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 718 (A.G. 2009), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 
(A.G. 2009). 
78 Id. 
79 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26–27; Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 718. 
80 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001) (upholding 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), 
which includes conditions for allowing aliens who have been ordered to be removed to be 
detained beyond the removal period, provided there is a regular administrative review of 
release matters). 
81 See id. at 701. 
82 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26–27; Gordon, supra note 3, at 641–42, 657. 
83 See Gordon, supra note 3, at 657. 
84 See id. at 658; supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text (discussing the threefold need 
for counsel). 
85 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 
(1984). 
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tion settings, a child held in “preventive custody” by the government is 
not detained, but rather in a custodial situation analogous to a child in 
his parent’s care.86 Current conditions surrounding the care and cus-
tody of unaccompanied minors, however, fail to satisfy even this broad 
standard of liberty.87 
 In Reno v. Flores, the Court held that a child’s liberty is not at risk 
“[w]here a juvenile has no available parent, close relative, or legal guar-
dian, where the government does not intend to punish the child, and 
where the conditions of governmental custody are decent and hu-
mane.”88 The Women’s Commission report challenges the assertion that 
ORR creates such an environment for detained unaccompanied alien 
children.89 Reports of abuse in detention facilities are not merely “iso-
lated instances” of conduct and are emblematic of the institutional am-
bivalence of HHS regarding its role as prosecutor and caretaker.90 This 
ambivalence creates a coercive environment incompatible with “paren-
tal care.”91 In particular, this atmosphere discourages the provision of 
legal representation.92 Similarly, the overuse of staff-secure and secure 
facilities creates a clear risk to a child’s liberty because such facilities are 
based on a correctional model, not a child welfare model, which is 
“wholly inappropriate for most unaccompanied alien children.”93 
 The failure of administrators to assess children regularly for the 
appropriateness of their transfer to other sites jeopardizes a child’s lib-
erty.94 While “stepping down” determinations may be less constitution-
                                                                                                                      
86 See Flores, 507 U.S. at 302; Schall, 467 U.S. at 265. In both cases, select justices soundly 
dismissed this analogy. See Flores, 507 U.S. at 316 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that 
the Court “rejected” the assertion that a child has a right “‘not to liberty but to custody’” 
(quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967))); Schall, 476 U.S. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that the majority’s characterization of preventive detention as merely a trans-
fer of custody from parent to state was “difficult to take seriously”). 
87 See Gordon, supra note 3, at 641–42. 
88 Flores, 507 U.S. at 303. 
89 See Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 14. 
90 See Perez-Funez v. Dist. Dir., INS, 619 F. Supp. 656, 668–69 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (dismiss-
ing charges that INS abuses were more than “isolated instances,” but finding that underly-
ing policies and procedures contained inherent due process defects which were “constitu-
tionally infirm”); Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 14. 
91 See Schall, 476 U.S. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
92 See Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 14. As the Women’s Commission reports, ORR 
“confuses the role of prosecutor and caretaker. This has affected the location of facilities; 
encouraged institutionalization, making the facilities more impersonal and prison-like; led 
to the sharing of children’s information between agencies; discouraged the provision of 
legal representation; and contributed to the absence of an effective oversight process.” Id. 
93 See id. at 18. 
94 See id. at 18, 57. 
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ally significant, such “conditional liberty” restrictions should neverthe-
less be considered in any assessment of a detained, unaccompanied 
child’s physical liberty.95 Finally, but no less significantly, Lassiter’s pre-
sumption against a right to counsel can be overcome without evidence 
of a potential loss of physical liberty.96 Returning to Eldridge, Lassiter 
warrants a right to counsel for unaccompanied alien children when a 
child’s interests are at “their strongest,” the State’s interest are at “their 
weakest,” and “the risks of error [are] at their peak.”97 
B. The Weight of the Individual Liberty Interest 
 How do the Eldridge factors compute for unaccompanied alien 
children? In key respects, liberty is effectively denied when unaccom-
panied alien children are forced to go forward in removal proceedings 
without counsel.98 Children may be eligible for various forms of relief, 
which include: asylum; the Special Immigrant Juvenile Visa for abused 
or abandoned children (“SIJ status”); criminal victim visas (“U visas”); 
trafficking visas (“T visas”); cancellation of removal; petitions for resi-
dency based upon family (including Violence Against Women Act peti-
tions); and voluntary departure.99 Although many children will not 
qualify for any relief, a “grave mistake” is made when an eligible child’s 
claims are not even heard.100 As the Supreme Court acknowledges, a 
removal hearing “involves issues basic to human liberty and happiness 
and, in the present upheavals in lands to which aliens may be returned, 
perhaps to life itself.”101 And when debating about whether expulsion 
can be regarded as punishment, unrepresented children represent the 
strongest evidence that it is nothing less: an unaccompanied alien child 
may spend all of his formative years in the United States, be unable to 
speak his native language, and have no memory of his native country or 
                                                                                                                      
95 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26. Lassiter recognizes that similar “conditional liberty” depri-
vations can be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Id. (discussing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 480 (1972) (denying appointed counsel in a parole revocation hearing)). 
96 See id. at 31. 
97 See id.; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
98 See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335; Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 14. 
99 See Janet M. Heppard & Anne Chandler, Immigrant Issues Affecting Children in Foster 
Care, State Bar of Texas, 32nd Annual Advanced Family Law Course, at 2–8 (August 14–17, 
2006) (on file with author); see also Nafziger, supra note 5, at 360 (discussing the particular 
rights and forms of relief available for unaccompanied minors in removal proceedings). 
100 See Perez-Funez, 619 F. Supp. at 660. 
101 See Wong Yang Sun v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950). 
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knowledge of his family’s whereabouts.102 Indeed, “‘if a banishment of 
this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, 
it will be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be ap-
plied.’”103 Without an attorney to identify viable avenues for relief and 
to pursue them by marshalling the facts, gathering the documentation, 
finding the witnesses, and presenting the necessary petitions and evi-
dence to the court, relief like SIJ status or cancellation of removal may 
never be considered, much less granted.104 The liberty of the child is 
imperiled when he or she is denied representation.105 
C. The Value of Additional Safeguards 
 Because unaccompanied alien children lack legal capacity, the risk 
that they will be denied their due process rights intensifies.106 There is a 
longstanding notion that children in any type of legal proceeding are 
                                                                                                                      
102 See Perez-Funez, 619 F. Supp. at 660. Deportation is not viewed as a criminal punish-
ment but rather as a civil sanction. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 
(1896) (allowing individuals to be deported but prohibiting such measures to be accom-
panied by the “infamous punishment at hard labor” or confiscation of property); Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“The order of deportation is not a pun-
ishment for a crime. . . . It is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of 
an alien who has not complied with the conditions [of his authorized stay].”). 
Despite the civil designation of removal proceedings, the punitive nature of expulsion 
has also been recognized since the first case of deportation. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 
740 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“[D]eportation is punishment. Every one knows that to be 
forcibly taken away from home and family and friends and business and property, and sent 
across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment and that oftentimes most severe and 
cruel.”). Some scholars have also openly recognized deportation as punishment. See, e.g., 
Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 97, 102 (1998) (“‘I suggest that now is the time to wipe the slate clean and admit to 
the long evident reality that deportation is punishment.’” (quoting Scheidemann v. INS, 83 
F.3d 1517, 1531 (3d Cir. 1996) (Sarokin, J., concurring))). 
103 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 741 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (quoting 4 Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Rec-
ommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, at 555 ( Jonathan 
Elliot ed., 2d rev. ed. 1891)). 
104 See Ross, supra note 55, at 1599. While arguing that child defendants should always 
be appointed counsel in civil litigation, Ross observes the following: 
The very characteristics that are frequently held to diminish children’s legal 
rights indicate that children cannot present their own court cases and there-
fore ought to have a special claim to appointed counsel. These characteristics 
establish that, in most instances, minors lack the ability to gather facts and 
deal with issues, handle their cases, understand legal issues, or conduct cross-
examination without guidance from an attorney. 
Id. 
105 See id. at 1571, 1588. 
106 See id. at 1604. 
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uniquely situated.107 In certain instances, such as decisions regarding 
early childhood education, a minor’s constitutional rights are diluted in 
light of the protection offered by his or her parents.108 Under other 
circumstances, however, a child’s interests are not subordinate.109 De-
tained, unaccompanied alien children constitute one group of children 
with a “peculiar vulnerability” requiring additional legal protections.110 
 An unaccompanied child, by definition, lacks the parental pres-
ence necessary to protect his or her interests.111 When communication 
with a child’s parents is possible, the child may be poorly served by his 
parents.112 In some cases, an unaccompanied child’s interests are di-
rectly opposed to those of his parents.113 For example, an unaccompa-
nied child may qualify for certain forms of immigration relief such as 
asylum, relief pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act, or SIJ sta-
tus because of parental abuse.114 
                                                                                                                      
107 Id. at 1571 n.1 (citing 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England *452). The vulnerability of children has been recognized by the legal system. See 
Finkel, supra note 26, at 1129–30; Ross, supra note 55, at 1590–95; Jarawan, supra note 26, 
at 134–35. 
108 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972) (holding that parents had 
a constitutional right to direct the education of their children); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (holding that parents had a constitutional right to direct the 
education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (holding that 
parents had a constitutional right to engage teachers in their children’s education); see also 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 621 (1979) (Stewart., J., concurring) (“For centuries it has 
been a canon of the common law that parents speak for their minor children.”). 
109 See Ross, supra note 55, at 1584–86. Ross outlines four categories in which children’s 
interests cannot be presumed to be protected by their parents: (1) when the interests of 
parents and children are not necessarily the same and the child’s interests are legitimate; 
(2) when parents may not be motivated by the child’s best interests; (3) when parents may 
not understand the child’s interests or be able to communicate them; and (4) when pro-
ceedings are between child and the state and the state is the child’s custodian. See id. 
110 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634–637 (1979) (recognizing three reasons to dis-
tinguish the constitutional rights of children from those of adults: “the peculiar vulnerabil-
ity of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; 
and the importance of the parental role in child rearing”). Ross argues that unaccompa-
nied alien children merit appointed counsel because they are being held in state custody. 
See Ross, supra note 55, at 1585–86. However, an unaccompanied child whose interests are 
in opposition to those of his parents or who has limited communication with distant par-
ents may also play a part in the child’s need for counsel. See id. at 1591–92. 
111 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2006) (defining an “un-
accompanied alien child”). 
112 See Ross, supra note 55, at 1588. 
113 See id. (arguing that deference to parents “unjustifiably deprives children of their 
own voice in the courtroom”). 
114 See Emily Rose Gonzalez, Note, Battered Immigrant Youth Take the Beat: Special Immi-
grant Juveniles Permitted to Age-Out of Status, 8 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 409, 426–27 (2009). 
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 While pro se children may theoretically petition for any and all 
forms of immigration relief, realistically they are unable to do so.115 
Unaccompanied alien children, like all unrepresented individuals, are 
severely handicapped by the complexity of immigration law.116 As many 
courts have suggested, the “labyrinth” design of U.S. immigration law is 
so complicated that only an attorney can navigate it.117 When a litigant 
appears pro se, an immigration judge bears the responsibility of devel-
oping the case in addition to serving as fact-finder and adjudicator.118 
The challenge of effectively serving not only as an advocate, but also as 
a neutral arbitrator, is obvious.119 Overworked immigration judges sim-
ply do not have the time to develop the complicated cases of the aliens 
before them.120 More importantly, the law limits the ability of immigra-
tion judges to serve as zealous advocates.121 
                                                                                                                      
115 See Ross, supra note 55, at 1600. 
116 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 (“[T]he complexity of the proceeding and the incapacity 
of the uncounseled parent could be, but would not always be, great enough to make the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of the parent’s rights insupportably high.”); Ross, supra 
note 55, at 1595–99. 
117 See Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act bears a “striking resemblance . . . [to] King Minos’s labyrinth in ancient 
Crete”); see also Castro-O’Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A lawyer is 
often the only person who could thread the labyrinth [of immigration laws].”); Perez-Funez, 
619 F. Supp. at 662 n.11 (relying on Lok’s “oft-quoted line” about the complexity of immi-
gration law). 
118 See Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 549 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Linda Kelly Hill, 
Holding the Due Process Line for Asylum, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 85, 100–01 (2007) (discussing 
the dual role of an immigration judge). 
119 See Kelly Hill, supra note 118, at 100–01. 
120 See id. For example, in fiscal year 2008, approximately 339,000 cases were decided. 
See Office of Planning, Analysis & Tech., FY 2008 Statistical Year Book, U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
Executive Office for Immigr. Rev., at B2 (March 2009), http://www.justice.gov/ 
eoir/statspub/fy08syb.pdf. Two hundred and seventy-seven languages were spoken by the 
aliens; fifteen percent spoke English and sixty-seven percent spoke Spanish. Id. at F1. More 
than half of the applicants lacked counsel. Id. at G1. 
As of October 2010 there were 224 immigration judges, listed by court. EOIR Immigration 
Court Listing, U.S. Department of Just., http://www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2011). Immigration courts are faced with an overwhelming workload. See 
Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political Response to Crisis in the Immigration Courts, 21 Geo. Im-
migr. L.J. 1, 19–20 (2006); Kelly Hill, supra note 118, at 105; Jarawan, supra note 26, at 141–
44. In addition to staggering workloads, immigration courts have been widely criticized for 
both intemperate and incompetent behavior. See Kelly Hill, supra note 118, at 85–94, 101–09. 
In response, the Department of Justice is augmenting its internal review and training prac-
tices. See id. at 89. There has been criticism of such developing standards and their individual 
application. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, A Second Look: Asylum Case Reopened After Justice Department 
Finds Misconduct by Immigration Judge, Nat’l L.J., Jan. 25, 2010, at 1. 
121 See Moran-Enriquez v. INS, 884 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[Immigration 
Judges] are not expected to be clairvoyant; the record before them must fairly raise the 
issue . . . .”); Duran v. INS, 756 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the immigra-
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 Congressional acts, EOIR standards, and DHS regulations already 
provide various special accommodations for unaccompanied alien chil-
dren.122 Notably, the EOIR guidelines for cases involving unaccompa-
nied alien children are specifically intended to “foster a child-friendly 
environment.”123 These guidelines encourage immigration judges to 
employ “child sensitive procedures” in order to take account of factors 
like a child’s “age, development, experience and self-determination.”124 
Judges are instructed on developing practical skills, such as how to form 
simple, active voice questions; evaluate a child’s credibility; develop the 
necessary rapport between the child and courtroom personnel; and 
otherwise accommodate a child’s physical and mental capacities.125 In 
numerous jurisdictions, special dockets have been created to segregate 
detained and non-detained juvenile cases from those of adults.126 
                                                                                                                      
tion court is responsible for informing an alien of the right to apply for relief when the 
record makes eligibility “apparent”); Ramirez-Gonzalez v. INS, 695 F.2d 1208, 1212 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (holding that an immigration judge must inform an alien of the availability of 
relief when eligibility is “apparent”). 
122 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1232(d)(1)–(d)(6) (West Supp. 2010) (amending the Special Immi-
grant Juvenile Status); id. § 1232(d)(7) (transferring all asylum claims of unaccompanied 
alien children to DHS asylum offices and eliminating the one-year filing deadline); see also 8 
C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(ii) (2010) (exempting unaccompanied alien child from one-year asylum 
filing deadline); id. § 1240.10(c) (prohibiting an immigration judge from accepting a plea of 
inadmissibility from an unrepresented, unaccompanied child); M. Aryah Somers et al., Con-
structions of Childhood and Unaccompanied Children in the Immigration System in the United States, 
14 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 311, 368–72 (2010) (noting that the TVPRA “has impacted 
the removal system’s structure by creating new roles for federal agencies”); Memorandum 
from the Chief Immigration Judge to all Immigration Judges, Court Adm’rs, Judicial Law 
Clerks, and Immigration Court Staff on the Guidelines for Immigration Court Cases Involv-
ing Unaccompanied Alien Children 3–8 (May 22, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ 
efoia/ocij/oppm07/07-01.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum on Guidelines for Cases Involving 
Unaccompanied Alien Children] (providing modified procedures for immigration court 
proceedings involving unaccompanied alien children); Press Release, Exec. Office for Immi-
gration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Unaccompanied Alien Children in Immigration Pro-
ceedings (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/08/UnaccompaniedAlienChil- 
drenApr08.htm [hereinafter Press Release, Unaccompanied Alien Children in Immigration 
Proceedings] (providing basic information on immigration court cases involving unaccom-
panied alien children). 
123 See Press Release, Unaccompanied Alien Children in Immigration Proceedings, su-
pra note 122. 
124 See Memorandum on Guidelines for Cases Involving Unaccompanied Alien Chil-
dren, supra note 122, at 2. 
125 Id. at 5–8. 
126 E-mail from Sarah Bronstein, Training and Legal Support Attorney, Catholic Legal 
Immigration Network, to author (Dec. 15, 2009, 3:01 PM) (on file with author). Based on a 
recent survey of child immigrant advocates, sixteen dockets have been established nationally 
for detained children and nine for non-detained children. Id. The sixteen courts with sepa-
rate juvenile dockets for detained children are Miami; New York; Seattle; San Francisco; Los 
Angeles; San Diego; Phoenix; El Paso; San Antonio; Harlingen; Houston; Chicago; Arlington, 
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 In spite of these accommodations, the atmosphere in an immigra-
tion court remains adversarial and formal.127 In all outward respects, an 
immigration hearing functions like a criminal proceeding.128 The im-
migration judge appears in a black robe and is seated behind a large, 
elevated dais.129 The DHS trial attorney prosecuting the removal is 
seated before the immigration judge at one table, and the unrepre-
sented child is seated alone at another.130 For detained children, other 
court personnel may also be present.131 During the hearing, the child is 
questioned by both the immigration judge and the DHS attorney.132 
Such a “gross disparity in power” can easily intimidate a child and pre-
vent him from adequately conveying his story.133 
                                                                                                                      
Virginia; Portland, Oregon; Newark; and Detroit. Id. The nine dockets for non-detained 
children are Miami, New York, Cleveland, Atlanta, Baltimore, Newark, Houston, Detroit, and 
Orlando. Id.; see also Wendy Young, Helping Immigrant Kids: Baltimore’s ‘Children’s Docket’ Is a 
Step Toward Making Immigration Court More Humane, Balt. Sun, Jan. 28, 2010, at 15A (discuss-
ing the recent opening of a non-detained docket in Baltimore). 
127 See Press Release, Unaccompanied Alien Children in Immigration Proceedings, supra 
note 122, at 3. In 2006, the Women’s Commission released an instructional video for chil-
dren, available in English, Creole, French, Fuchow, and Spanish, regarding immigration 
court and the various forms of legal relief most common to child applicants. See DVD: What 
Happens When I Go to Immigration Court? (Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and 
Children 2006), available at http://www.hklaw.com/id207/; see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 
(evaluating the nature of the court proceedings in Fifth Amendment appointed counsel 
challenges); Taylor, supra note 51, at 1666–67 (recognizing the heightened need for counsel 
in immigration proceedings due to their adversarial and complex nature). 
128 See Legomsky & Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 654–57 (giving a detailed account of 
the nature of immigration court proceedings). 
129 See Memorandum on Guidelines for Cases Involving Unaccompanied Alien Chil-
dren, supra note 122, at 6. While immigration court guidelines generally require an immi-
gration judge to wear a black robe, the guidelines with respect to children allow a judge to 
remove the robe if it is discomforting for a child. Id. 
130 See id. at 5. EOIR guidelines permit a child to have an adult companion sit at the 
table and do not require a child to testify from the witness stand so that the companion 
may continue sitting beside the child. Id. Nonetheless, an unaccompanied child is still 
likely to appear alone. See Haddal, supra note 1, at 15. For children detained in remote 
facilities, family or friends may not be financially capable of traveling to such a hearing. See 
Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 4. Fear also prevents undocumented family and friends 
from attending. See id. at 7 n.40. 
131 See DVD: What Happens When I Go to Immigration Court?, supra note 127 (noting 
that other necessary personnel such as an interpreter and clerk may also be present in the 
immigration courtroom) 
132 See id. 
133 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Lassiter, Jus-
tice Blackmun recognized the proceedings would remain “adversarial, formal, and quin-
tessentially legal. [The provision of counsel], however, would diminish the prospect of an 
erroneous termination, a prospect that is inherently substantial, given the gross disparity 
in power and resources between the State and the uncounseled indigent parent.” Id. 
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 Statistical analyses confirm that an unrepresented child cannot 
overcome the complexities of immigration law and the demands of the 
courtroom: a child represented by counsel is four times more likely to 
win asylum.134 Moreover, because violations of detention and reunifica-
tion standards are beyond the jurisdiction of immigration courts, an 
unrepresented child’s chances of mounting a successful challenge to 
violations of these standards are bleak.135 Without counsel or access to 
family, the child is left to his own devices and expected to single-
handedly research the relevant federal or state authorities empowered 
to check abuses by HHS or independent contractors operating deten-
tion facilities.136 
 The promotion of pro bono programs for unaccompanied alien 
children by the DOJ, HHS, and Congress reflect the federal govern-
ment’s keen awareness of the risks faced by unrepresented children.137 
After years of effort and optimism, however, pro bono services remain 
in short supply.138 Both the Director of DUCS and EOIR’s Pro Bono 
Coordinator support the conclusion of the Women’s Commission that 
pro bono representation is insufficient.139 Although the recent effort to 
fund CLINIC’s national pro bono program may improve the coordina-
tion of counsel for released children, it will not address the shortage of 
counsel for children detained by the federal government.140 
D. The Cost of Providing Representation 
 What government advantage outweighs “‘the grievous loss”’ en-
dured by a pro se, unaccompanied child erroneously deported by a 
complex adversarial legal proceeding in which his interests were not 
fairly represented?141 What public interest is served by a detained, pro 
se child who is abused by his custodian and unable to find help? What 
                                                                                                                      
134 See Christopher Nugent, Protecting Unaccompanied Immigrant and Refugee Children in the 
United States, A.B.A. Hum. Rts. Mag., Winter 2005, at 9, available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
irr/hr/winter05/immigrant.html. 
135 See id. 
136 See Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 29–34 (criticizing DUCS’s limited internal 
grievance process and children’s inability to use it). 
137 See generally id.(discussing the findings of the Women’s Commission on the repre-
sentation of unaccompanied children). 
138 See Nugent, supra note 134, at 1–4. 
139 See Halfway Home, supra note 1, at 23. 
140 See Press Release, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, supra note 33 (providing 
further discussion of CLINIC’s recently announced national project). 
141 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254, 263 (1970)). 
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benefit accrues through the prolonged detention of a pro se child who 
cannot articulate his legal right to be reunited with his family? 
 As the Supreme Court instructed in Bounds v. Smith, “the cost of 
protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial.”142 Right 
to representation by counsel, particularly for children, is not simply a 
“formality” or “grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement” but rather 
reflects “the essence of justice.”143 The government and unaccompa-
nied alien children share a common interest. Serving justice, not re-
moval at all costs, is a government “win.”144 Forcing children to venture 
alone through a morass of legal proceedings damages, rather than pro-
tects, the system’s integrity.145 Furthermore, when legal advocates pro-
vide an independent check on the potential abuses of system adminis-
trators, the system itself gains credibility.146 Given the adversarial nature 
of immigration court proceedings, the provision of counsel to unac-
companied alien children does not exact the potentially high cost of 
requiring counsel in more informal, non-adversarial settings or subvert 
a court’s therapeutic aims.147 
 Appointed counsel may also yield concrete cost savings.148 Having 
had the opportunity to meet privately with counsel, review potential 
claims, and rely upon sound legal advice, children who pursue their 
cases will focus only on viable claims.149 If there are no workable alter-
natives, a child may more readily concede removability.150 Such a seri-
                                                                                                                      
142 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977); Ross, supra note 55, at 1608. 
143 See Kent v. United Sates, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966) (prior to Gault, holding that chil-
dren who may be transferred from juvenile to criminal court proceedings and subject to 
felony prosecution have a right to counsel); Ross, supra note 55, at 1579. See generally Cath-
erine J. Ross, Disposition in a Discretionary Regime: Punishment and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile 
Justice System, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 1037 (1995) (discussing the effects of Gault and Kent on the 
juvenile justice system). 
144 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (majority opinion). These are not the only circumstances 
where the government and children share an interest. See id. (“Since the State has an ur-
gent interest in the welfare of the child, it shares the parent’s interest in an accurate and 
just decision.”). 
145 Finkel, supra note 26, at 1132. 
146 See id. 
147 See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 38–39 n.65 (“‘Fears also have been expressed that the 
formality lawyers would bring into juvenile court would defeat the therapeutic aims of the 
court.’”) (quoting President’s Comm’n on Law Enforcement & Admin. of Justice, The 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 86 (1967)). 
148 See Finkel, supra note 26, at 1132–37. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. The titles of various reports evaluating pro bono programs as well as the focus 
of the evaluations suggest the government’s strong interest in efficiency. See, e.g., Press Re-
lease, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR’s Legal Orientation 
Program—Evaluation Report by Vera Institute: Findings Show LOP Is Effective in Educating 
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ous concession should only come after receiving the benefit of legal 
advice.151 Consequently, the assistance of counsel will create more or-
derly hearings, thereby enhancing courtroom efficiency.152 As Justice 
Stevens argued in his Lassiter dissent, counsel will reduce the “difficulty 
and exasperation” evident in trials where litigants appear pro se.153 In 
light of the recognized intemperance of many immigration judges, 
such benefits afforded by counsel are particularly valuable.154 Represen-
tation may also expedite family reunification determinations and allow 
more oversight of detention conditions.155 Accordingly, providing un-
accompanied alien children with representation will reduce the unwar-
ranted detentions and improve care overall. 
 “Checks on efficiency” arguments must also be recognized in a due 
process analysis.156 Flanked by an appointed attorney throughout the 
proceedings, each child will continually have the opportunity to meet 
with his or her counsel, review his or her counsel’s advice, and decide 
how to proceed.157 Inevitably, some proceedings will become more pro-
tracted as more detailed pleadings, arguments, and appeals necessarily 
prolong the process.158 It is conceivable that “[a]t some point” the bene-
fits of appointed counsel for unaccompanied alien children “may be 
outweighed by the cost.”159 These costs, however, can be contained.160 
                                                                                                                      
Detainees and Improving Court Efficiency (May 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ 
press/08/LegalOrientationProgramEvalFactSheet051508.htm; Press Release, Exec. Office 
for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, New Legal Orientation Program Underway to 
Aid Detained Aliens: Legal Orientations Benefit Individuals, Reduce Detention Time (Mar. 
11, 2003), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/03/LegalOrientationProgramRelease0311.pdf 
(describing EOIR introduction of adult LOP program); Nina Siulc et al., Improving Efficiency 
and Promoting Justice in the Immigration System, Vera Inst. of Just., 1–4 (May 2008), http:// 
www.vera.org/download?file=1780/LOP%2BEvaluation_May2008_final.pdf; see also Bindra 
& Ben-Cohen, supra note 55, at 34 (advancing similar efficiency arguments supporting ap-
pointed counsel in the civil context). 
151 See Finkel, supra note 26, at 1132–37. 
152 See id. 
153 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
154 See Kelly Hill, supra note 118, at 93. 
155 See Finkel, supra note 26, at 1132–37. 
156 See Kelly Hill, supra note 1, at 271. In the pro bono setting, the government effi-
ciency rationale creates a conflict of interest for pro bono agencies that both seek federal 
monies and allow program or case efficiency to limit zealous representation of individuals. 
Id. By preventing the competitive aspect of the existing contractual system, conflicts will 
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The procedural protection of counsel afforded by the due process 
clause is limited to children apprehended inside the United States.161 
From a pragmatic point of view, the government may limit its exposure 
to constitutional demands for counsel by continuing to fund pro bono 
projects that more efficiently secure counsel for detained children.162 
Therefore, the government has an additional incentive to manage the 
costs of counsel.163 
E. The Right to Counsel as a Group Right 
 As a final matter, recognizing that unaccompanied alien children 
possess a broad right to counsel as a class—compared to the current 
process of individualized, case-by-case determinations—is judicially 
sound and efficient.164 Procedural guarantees are traditionally awarded 
to groups, not individuals.165 Instead of ensuring fairness, the ad hoc 
approach adds unnecessary judicial costs, turning courts into “‘super-
legal-aid bureau[s].’”166 Moreover, courts reviewing whether counsel 
should have been provided necessarily assess the circumstances with the 
benefit of hindsight, and courts cannot effectively evaluate the benefits 
counsel could have provided.167 As Justice Blackmun warned, “The 
pleadings and transcript of an uncounseled termination proceeding at 
most will show the obvious blunders and omissions of the defendant 
. . . . Determining the difference legal representation would have made 
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becomes possible only through imagination, investigation, and legal 
research focused on the particular case.”168 
Conclusion 
 While the Lassiter test stands as a “stumbling block” between unac-
companied alien children and their right to counsel, a child’s legal 
needs combined with the conditions of his or her detention can over-
come this formidable obstacle. Unaccompanied alien children are uni-
quely and dangerously poised when forced to navigate the complex 
waters of the legal system without the aid of an attorney. Relief in an 
immigration court, the enforcement of detention standards, and reuni-
fication with family all hinge on effective legal representation. The ef-
forts of the DOJ, DHS, and HHS to improve the treatment of children 
are no substitute for the critical role played by independent counsel. 
Despite repeated calls for statutory reform and the dramatic increase in 
the number of unaccompanied alien children in federal custody, Con-
gress has taken no action. A child’s right to be heard calls upon the 
voice of the Constitution. 
                                                                                                                      
168 Id.; see also Gardner, supra note 55, at 74 (recognizing the inefficiency of Lassiter’s 
case-by-case public counsel analysis). 
  
INSERTED BLANK PAGE 
